We consider the fundamental issue of what makes a 'good' probability forecast for a central bank operating within an inflation targeting framework. We provide two examples in which the candidate forecasts comfortably outperform those from benchmark specifications by conventional statistical metrics such as root mean squared prediction errors and average logarithmic scores. Our assessment of economic significance uses an explicit loss function that relates economic value to a forecast communication problem for an inflation targeting central bank. We analyse the Bank of England's forecasts for inflation during the period in which the central bank operated within a strict inflation targeting framework in our first example. In our second example, * The Reserve Bank of New Zealand's discussion paper series is externally ref-
we consider forecasts for inflation in New Zealand generated from vector autoregressions, when the central bank operated within a flexible inflation targeting framework. In both cases, the economic significance of the performance differential exhibits sensitivity to the parameters of the loss function and, for some values, the differentials are economically negligible. c
Non-technical Summary
Inflation targeting central banks devote considerable resources to modelling and assessing the future path of inflation, and to understanding previous forecast errors. Nearly all monetary policymakers also issue periodic ex ante inflation event warnings-telling the public when the path of inflation is expected to move outside "normal" levels. In this paper, we show that strong forecast performance by conventional statistical metrics is not su cient for a candidate forecasting method to be helpful when the bank wishes to warn the public about inflation events. We use two specific examples to illustrate the importance of this finding for both strict and flexible inflation targeting central banks.
The first example considers the UK inflation forecasts published by the Bank of England, operating within a strict inflation targeting regime. The second example evaluates inflation forecasts produced from vector autoregressions, using a sample of New Zealand data, drawn from the period in which the Reserve Bank operated within a flexible inflation targeting framework. In both examples, a conventional statistical analysis would have misled a policymaker about the sensitivity of the forecast performance from an economic perspective. Specifically, for some parameters of the loss function used in our examples, the performance gains over the benchmark models are negligible.
1 Introduction "Given . . . (the) asymmetric costs or benefits of particular outcomes, a central bank needs to consider not only the most likely future path for the economy, but also the distribution of possible outcomes about that path. The decisionmakers then need to reach a judgment about the probabilities, costs, and benefits of the various possible outcomes . . ." Greenspan (2004, p 37) .
Although central banks devote considerable resources to assessing the probabilities of inflation events, many of the evaluation techniques used in practice assess forecast performance from a statistical rather than an economic perspective. One approach is to ignore the ex ante uncertainty about the point forecast and simply use a test of relative forecast accuracy based on Root Mean Squared Prediction Error (RMSPE). An alternative is to use the average logarithmic score of candidate forecast densities. The second approach-less commonly adopted by practitioners but increasingly prevalent in academic work-does take account of the ex ante probabilistic information contained in the forecast density. Examples of recent studies in the macro forecasting literature deploying at least one of these approaches include Bjørnland et al (2011) , Garratt et al (2011 ), Clark (2011 , Conflitti, De Mol and Giannone (2015) , Aastveit et al (2014) , Del Negro, Hasegawa and Schorfheide (2014) , and Kruger, Clark and Ravazzolo (2015) .
The novel contribution of our paper is that we gauge the extent to which statistical measures of forecast performance misrepresent the usefulness of a forecast to an inflation targeting central bank. We provide two examples of inflation forecasting using data where the central banks concerned operate in strict and flexible inflation targeting frameworks, respectively. We gauge forecast performance in both statistical and economic terms in each case. The statistical measures used are the RMSPE and the average logarithmic score. In contrast, economic significance relates to a specific loss function in which as Greenspan (2004) suggests ". . . the probabilities, costs and benefits" of communication actions matter to the inflation targeting central bank. Specifically, the central bank makes public statements about the risk that inflation will exceed the upper bound of the target interval. The policymaker faces asymmetric costs in the sense that the social cost of an anticipated inflation event is less than the cost of an unanticipated event. In contrast, (among others) Diks et al (2011 ), Galbraith and van Norden (2011 ) and Gneiting and Ranjan (2011 move beyond RMSPE and the average logarithmic score by examining alternative statistical performance measures, rather than relating the forecasts directly to the economic value of the forecast user as we do in this paper.
In our first example, we analyse the Bank of England's published forecasts for inflation during the period in which the central bank operated within a strict inflation targeting framework. In our second example, we consider forecasts for inflation in New Zealand generated from vector autoregressions, using a sample drawn from the period in which the central bank operated within a flexible inflation targeting framework. In both examples, the candidate forecasts overwhelmingly outperform statistically those from an autoregressive benchmark using conventional metrics (RMSPE and the average logarithmic score).
However, the economic value of the performance di↵erential (relative to the autoregressive benchmark) varies with the degree of asymmetry in economic costs associated with anticipated and unanticipated inflation events. In economic terms, the performance advantage in our examples lies between zero and (just over) 60 percent. For the two central banks considered here, operating under di↵erent inflation targeting frameworks, the extreme sensitivity of relative forecast performance would be missed by a policymaker restricting attention to more conventional measures of statistical forecast evaluation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we set out background information about inflation targeting in the UK and New Zealand and our decision-theoretic framework for forecast evaluation based on the communication of ex ante inflation risks. In Section 3, we describe the empirical methods, data and results for our Bank of England example. In Section 4, we provide an analysis of model-based forecasting in New Zealand. We draw some conclusions and ideas for extending the analysis in the final section.
Inflation Targeting and Decision-theoretic Forecast Evaluation
In this section, we begin by describing the forecast communication strategies followed by the Bank of England and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Then, we introduce our decision-theoretic framework for forecast evaluation and relate it to forecast communication in practice.
Inflation forecast communication
Nearly all central banks routinely produce reports on the state of the macroeconomy, focusing specifically on explicit forecasts for inflation (along with other key macroeconomic variables). However, for central banks operating within an inflation target, the inflation forecasts and the assessments of ex ante inflation risks have particular importance.
The attention a↵orded to the probability of inflation events in central bank press releases provides some indication of the importance of pre-emptive risk assessment and communication. For example, the Governor's Opening Remarks to the Bank of England's Inflation Report Press Conference in February 2010 stressed that "The January figure for CPI inflation is likely to have exceeded 3% . . . This would be the third episode when inflation has temporarily moved above the target . . ."
The importance of inflation events relative to the UK's target interval reflects, in 2.2 Decision-theoretic framework Greenspan (2004) describes monetary policymaking in terms of decisions based on both the probabilities of events and the asymmetric costs of the available options. In this section, we describe a one-period framework in which these considerations influence the decision to issue an ex ante inflation warning to the public.
In the examples that follow, the central banks concerned nearly always forewarned of high inflation events-when inflation is forecast to be above the upper bound of the inflation target with high probability. Low inflation events are rare in our data, with just one outturn below the lower bound of the (medium) term inflation target in New Zealand, and none in the United Kingdom. So for expositional ease, we restrict attention to a single threshold that defines the event. (See Pesaran (2000a and 2000b) on extensions to multiple thresholds.) Also for expositional convenience, we treat the threshold of interest as time invariant. The upper bounds of the targets are constant for both central banks in the examples presented below.
In our decision-theoretic forecast evaluation framework, we assume that the central bank is concerned with the accuracy of forecasts relative to a given upper bound of the inflation target (interval), denoted⇡.
4 Based on the forecast, the policymaker takes one of two communication actions. Either the policymaker issues a preemptive inflation event warning to the public, or not. If the central bank warns of the event, there is a oneperiod economic cost to society of C, reflecting the adjustment of the private sector to the information. (In principle, the cost could be contingent on actual outturn for inflation but we abstract from this for simplicity.) If the central bank fails to issue an inflation event warning but the event occurs, society incurs a one-period loss, L, where 0 < C < L.
This cost reflects the economic loss to the private sector of an unanticipated inflation event. The costs are asymmetric in that the cost to society of an anticipated inflation event, C, is less than the cost of the unanticipated event, L.
The optimal rule for publishing the warning can be derived for a given inflation threshold,⇡. Since society incurs the per period cost C if the warning is issued (regardless of whether the event subsequently occurs), the expected cost of the warning is C. The expected loss from the alternative communication strategy-that is, "no warning"-is p⇡L,
where p⇡ represents the probability that the inflation event occurs. Hence, the policymaker needs a probabilistic forecast in order to decide whether to issue an inflation event warning, or not. (We assume that this is a one step ahead forecast and discuss the multiple horizon case in the subsequent subsection.) Assuming the policymaker minimises expected cost, an inflation event warning will be issued provided that R = C/L < p⇡.
On the other hand, if R = C/L p⇡, then the policymaker issues no warning. Note that the framework implies that smaller probabilities trigger inflation event warnings for low
R.
5 In our applied work, we shall treat R as an unknown parameter and examine the robustness of forecast performance across a range of values.
Similar frameworks have been deployed in previous research to study applied forecasting problems in meteorology, finance and economics. See, for examples unrelated to monetary policy, Murphy (1977) , Katz and Murphy (1997) (2011), and Luciani and Ricci (2015) . In these papers, the loss function is not explicitly motivated by an economic decision, as is done in this paper. Arguably, within an inflation targeting framework, policymakers should be concerned with the economic significance of forecast performance, which in our examples
depends on (what Greenspan describes as) ". . . the probabilities, costs and benefits" of their communication actions. Since policy changes a↵ect the real economy with a considerable time lag, and realtime data are released with a publication lag, the short-term path of inflation is in e↵ect predetermined. In the two applications that follow, for expositional ease, we will restrict attention to one step ahead forecasts. That is, given the time lag in releases of macroeconomic data, we consider "nowcasts" in our applied work.
Discussion
There are similarities between the nowcast inflation event warnings given by inflation targeting central banks and the verbal warnings commonly published by meteorologists.
For a meteorology o ce to warn of a storm requires a probabilistic forecast of the extreme event.
6 Meteorology o ces publish forecast densities but often prefer to communicate with the public via explicit verbal warnings because many forecast users find complete densities di cult to interpret. Similarly, a central bank concerned with the bounds of an inflation target may prefer verbal inflation event warnings (regardless of whether the forecast densities themselves are published) because the public prefers this communication strategy.
In practice, and in contrast to the communication framework deployed in this paper, central bankers tend to forewarn of inflation events over multiple horizons, with policymakers often stressing the date at which inflation will likely return to target. 7 Beyond the inflation nowcast considered in our analysis, the central bank's forecasts (and interest policy decisions) influence the future-a complexity not confronted by weather forecasters.
3 Bank of England Forecasts
In this application, we examine the Bank of England's published forecasts from the perspective of our decision-theoretic framework. We begin by fleshing out the background to the production of the forecasts, then describe the forecasts themselves, and subsequently present the results.
Background
The The Bank of England's forecasting record has been subject to considerable scrutiny.
See, for example, Wallis (2004) , Clements (2004) , Gneiting and Ranjan (2011) and Galbraith and van Norden (2012) . The general finding is that the Bank of England's one quarter ahead forecasts outperform statistical benchmarks on samples prior to the most recent recession. Galbraith and van Norden (2012) note that the forecasts are well calibrated but typically lack resolution-meaning that the probabilities are close to those of the unconditional probability of the relevant event but often fail to give accurate conditional probabilities. Gneiting and Ranjan (2011) find that at longer horizons, on a pre-recession sample, the Bank's forecast tend to be over dispersed.
9 Probabilisitic forecasts for GDP growth have been published since November 1997.
Forecasts
We The Bank of England's forecasts are generated from a two-piece normal; see the discussions in Wallis (2004 Wallis ( , 2005 . The parameters can be obtained from the Bank of England.
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As Galbraith and van Norden (2012) and Franta et al (2014) note, the two-piece normal methodology permits the members of the MPC to allow for asymmetric risks in their projections. The parameters of each fan chart result from a combination of model-based forecasts with expert-judgement, and represent the views of the MPC. At each point in time, the members assume that interest rates will remain constant thereafter at the current level.
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Following, Gneiting and Ranjan (2011) , the two-piece normal distribution is written:
where the parameters µ, 1 and 2 denote the mode, and standard deviation of the left and right hand side of the distribution, respectively.
Results
Before undertaking the decision-theoretic evaluation of the Bank of England's one step ahead forecasts for inflation relative to the AR(1) benchmark, we begin by considering more conventional forecast metrics. In terms of point forecasting, using the median of the Turning to a forecast evaluation based on the whole predictive density, the results are similar to the point forecasting case. For example, the Bank of England's forecasts produce an average logarithmic score of -0.1278; whereas, the AR(1) benchmark scores 1.037. A test of relative forecasting accuracy based on the di↵erential in the average logarithmic scores (see Bao et al, 2007) comfortably rejects the null of equal forecast accuracy at the 2% level.
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We display the forecasts produced by the Bank of England in Figure 1 Interestingly, realisations rarely occur in the outer probability percentiles of the Bank's forecast densities-suggesting that MPC lack confidence in their own projections. This characteristic is particularly striking post-2009. Apparently, the MPC members perceived greater forecast uncertainty for inflation after the Great Recession.
We plot the (end-evaluation) Probability Integral Transforms (PITs) in Figure 2 to provide another perspective on the Bank of England's forecasting performance. Wellcalibrated forecast densities should produce a uniform distribution for the PITs. 14 In particular, the first two forecast bins are empty-the realisations of inflation never fall in the lower tail of the forecast density. That is, the MPC members see too much downside risk to inflation.
We plot the corresponding objects of interest for the AR(1) benchmark in Figure 3 and we turn now to our decision-theoretic based evaluation to address the issue of economic significance. Specifically, we examine whether the advantage in forecast performancesuggested by standard point and density forecast evaluation techniques-is su cient for the forecasts to be assessed as "good" when communicating the risk of high inflation events to the public within the inflation targeting regime. In particular, we consider the robustness across a range of parameters reflecting the asymmetric costs in the loss function.
Recall that Total Economic Loss, T EL, depends on both action and realisation. The "action" is that the policymaker issues a preemptive event warning of the inflation event.
Namely, that inflation will exceed the 3% threshold of the inflation target. If the realisation is that the inflation realisation exceeds that threshold, then a letter of explanation must be sent by the Bank's Governor to the Chancellor. As discussed earlier, we assume that the preemptive inflation event warning results is a one-period (time-invariant) cost of C, irrespective of whether the event occurs. On the other hand, in the absence of a warning, an economic loss, L, is incurred only if the inflation event occurs. The relative cost ratio, R = C/L, will lie in the region 0 < R < 1, since the costs are asymmetric.
We denote the number of observations in which action was taken (the warning issued), but the inflation event did not occur, as n 01 . We denote the number of observations in which action was taken and the event did occur n 00 . In both of these cases, the cost is C > 0. We denote the number of times that no action was taken and the event did not happen n 11 . In this case, society incurs no cost. We denote the number of observations in which no action was taken but the event occurs n 10 , giving a loss of L.
Then, the (end of evaluation) Total Economic Loss, T EL, can be expressed as:
T EL = Ln 10 + C(n 01 + n 00 ).
We plot T EL against R for the Bank of England's forecasts and for the AR (1) We stress that the performance gain shown in Figure 5 is always smaller, and for high R much smaller than that suggested by, for example, RMSPE, which indicated a 70% improvement over the benchmark. Recall that, given our forecast communication framework, values of R reflect di↵erences between the economic costs of anticipated and unanticipated inflation events. Since the performance di↵erential is negligible for R greater than 0.95, there is no economic value to using the Bank's forecasts if the costs of unanticipated inflation are 95% (or more) of the costs of anticipated inflation. The over-dispersion of the Bank's forecast densities triggers too many inflation warnings in general. And for high R, in particular, this erodes the performance di↵erential. (As noted in discussing Figure   1 and Figure 2 , the MPC's perception of the risk of low inflation realisations appears particularly misplaced but this matters little for "high" inflation events.)
We plot the one step ahead probabilities of the event (that inflation exceeds the 3% threshold) for the Bank's projections and for the AR(1) forecasts in Figure 6 . This plot is consistent with the interpretation that the Bank's capacity to give accurate one step ahead forecasts stems from the timely nature of its forecasts, based on intra-quarterly information. The probabilities are similar but the Bank typically leads the benchmark by one quarter. Also, the Bank's probabilities of exceeding the inflation target upper bound are often slightly higher than the AR(1), reflecting the additional uncertainty perceived by the MPC members, particularly since the Great Recession; see Figure 1 and Figure   3 .
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In summary, the density forecasts published by the Bank of England provide helpful information about the probability of inflation being outside the inflation target. But, the extent of the improvement in forecast performance (relative to an AR (1) benchmark) varies with asymmetry in costs, captured by the parameter R. The sensitivity of forecast performance would be missed by a policymaker examining only more conventional statistical measures of forecast performance. Since RMSPE and average logarithmic predictive scores abstract from the communication actions (and their relative costs) available to the policymaker in our framework, they overstate the performance gain that accrues from the Bank's forecasts for some parameter values.
VAR Forecasts for NZ Inflation
In this application, we generate out of sample forecasts for inflation from vector autoregressions, and evaluate the probabilistic predictions from the perspective of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's flexible inflation target.
15 The average point forecasts di↵er little between the two approaches.
Background
The forecasts published by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand represent the views of the Governor, having taken into account analysis and discussions with the sta↵. In the absence of publicly available forecast densities for inflation from the Reserve Bank, we generate inflation forecasts from a bivariate VAR for inflation and the output gap, estimated on a sample from New Zealand's inflation targeting regime.
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The Reserve Bank's current inflation targeting framework specifies that: "(T)he policy target shall be to keep future CPI inflation outcomes between 1 per cent and 3 per cent on average over the medium term, with a focus on keeping future average inflation near the 2 per cent target midpoint."
Clause 2b, Policy Targets Agreement, September 20, 2012.
16 The Monetary Policy Committee of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is an internal body which considers projections together with analysis, and provides advice to help inform policy decisions.
17 In practice, other endogenous and exogenous variables may help forecast New Zealand inflation. To simplify our example contrasting the economic and statistical significance of evaluation metrics for probabilistic forecasts, we restrict attention here to a simple bivariate relationship. 
Forecasts
To generate our model-based forecast densities, we utilise a bivariate VAR model space for inflation and the output gap (the deviation of real output from potential). The output gap measure is derived by univariate detrending, utilising Bayesian estimation methods. Similar "o↵-model" filters have been deployed by van Norden (2002, 2005) , and Edge and Rudd (2012) . Although van Norden (2002, 2005) The pragmatic o↵-model filtering approach is often used by central banks in practice, including the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
18 The Appendix describes the detrending method, the priors, the Bayesian estimation methods and the forecast combinations in detail. Given the focus aim of this paper is to consider the economic significance of forecast performance di↵erentials from the perspective of the inflation target, we focus on the ensemble VAR forecasts for inflation, rather than the interpretation of the output gap, or the weights on particular forecasts.
Although inflation targeting was established in New Zealand in 1989, the transition years were characterised by volatile inflation expectations. Hence, recursive VAR parameter estimation begins in 1992.01, using an expanding window up to the forecast origin.
Evaluation is based on a sample defined by the forecast targets from 2000.01 to 2013.03
(with forecast origins 1999.04 to 2013.02). In total, we consider 55 forecasts. As in the previous example involving the Bank of England's forecasts, we consider an AR (1) benchmark utilised by Gneiting and Ranjan (2011) . 
Results
As with the previous application, before undertaking the decision-theoretic evaluation, we begin by considering more conventional forecast metrics. In terms of point forecasting, the VAR's RMSPE is 0.3868. In contrast, the AR(1) benchmark produces a RMSPE of 0.6137. A gain in forecast accuracy relative to the benchmark of just under 40%. A Diebold and Mariano (1995) test with the small sample adjustment suggested by Harvey, Leybourne and Newbold (1997) comfortably rejects the null hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy at the 1% significance level (in a two-sided test).
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Looking at forecast evaluations based on the whole predictive density, the results are similar to the point forecasting case. The VAR produces an average (end of evaluation) logarithmic score of -0.7861. The corresponding figure for the benchmark AR (1) is -1.155.
As a rough guide to statistical significance, our test of relative forecasting accuracy based on the di↵erential in the average logarithmic scores (see Bao et al, 2007) rejects the null of equal forecast accuracy at the 3% level.
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We plot the forecasts produced by the VAR and the AR(1) benchmark specification in Figures 7 and 8 . These display the (sequence of) one step ahead forecast densities and the NZ inflation realisations (solid line), together with the quantiles (0.01; 0.05; 0.10; 0.33; 0.66; 0.90; 0.95; 0.99) . Like the Bank of England's forecasts, the one step ahead VAR forecast densities for inflation in New Zealand exhibit only mild asymmetries, even through the Great Recession. In general, for New Zealand data, the forecast densities from the VAR are considerably less di↵use than those from the AR(1) benchmark and di↵usion alters little through the Great Recession. As a consequence of this, towards the end of the evaluation the benchmark model attributes small probabilities to negative inflation events, whereas the VAR forecasts imply that, for example, below zero inflation is a zero probability event throughout the evaluation.
Figures 9 and 10 display the PITs. In both cases, the forecast densities display departures from the uniform distribution. The sharpness of the VAR forecast densities result in too many realisations in the upper tail. The AR(1) benchmark su↵ers somewhat from the same characteristic-despite having relatively di↵use forecast densities. Figure 11 plots the one step ahead probability of inflation events with realisations above the 3% threshold. The VAR gives a slightly earlier warning of inflationary episodes than the AR(1), with probabilities somewhat higher during these high inflation events.
Turning to the decision-theoretic based evaluation, we examine forecast performance from the perspective of issuing preemptive inflation event warnings. Recall that the (end of evaluation) Total Economic Loss, T EL, can be expressed as:
We plot T EL against R for the VAR with the AR(1) benchmark normalised to 1 in Figure 12 . Relative to the benchmark, the VAR specification performs well. The gain to the VAR over the benchmark, for values of R between 0.2 and 0.4, lies in the range 15% to 45%. That is, the relative TEL lies between 0.85 and 0.55. With R greater than 0.2, the performance advantage drops (non-monotonically) as R rises.
Hence, from the perspective of our communication framework for inflation targeting, the usefulness of the VAR exhibits sensitivity to the parameter R, which reflects the relative cost of anticipated and unanticipated inflation events. Whether a candidate forecast is "good" from an economic perspective depends on the critical probability that would trigger an inflation event warning by the central bank. Unfortunately, RMSPE and average logarithmic predictive scores abstract from the communication actions (and their relative costs) available to the policymaker in our framework. As a result, the sensitivity of forecast performance from an economic perspective would be missed when examining more conventional statistical measures of forecast performance. 
Conclusions
where  t and  ⇤ t are uncorrelated noise disturbances with the same variance, 2  . The parameter ⇢ is a damping factor, with 0 < ⇢ < 1. A smaller damping factor implying a less amplified cycle (for a given 2  ). The parameter controls the frequency of the cycle. For example, equals 0.3 would be a cycle of 21 quarters. We assume that the cycle is second order in our application, n = 2.
We estimate the two cyclical parameters ⇢ and , and three variance parameters ✏ , ⇣ , and  using Bayesian methods to produce posterior distributions for each parameter, and then draw from these distributions to produce estimates of the cyclical component of (log) GDP. We iterate the MCMC algorithm 50,000 times, and burn the first 48,000.
Our priors are similar to those utilised by Harvey et al (2007) in their analysis of US GDP for a second-order cycle. The posterior means for the parameters 0.64, 0.29, 11.1, 4.9 and 9.8 for ⇢, , ✏ , ⇣ , and  , respectively. Using the posterior means, the cyclical component constructed from this process is similar to that constructed using an HP filter with lambda equal to 1600. We also experimented with a prior specification that allowed for greater flexibility in the trend. This variant produced a similar forecast performance for New Zealand inflation in bivariate vector autoregressions.
APPENDIX 2: Ensemble Forecasting with Vector Autoregressions
The forecasts for New Zealand inflation are generated from an ensemble of vector autoregressions (VAR) following Garratt et al (2011) , using "real-time" data.
Since the analysis in this paper is concerned with one step ahead forecasts only, the output gap forecasts do not influence the forecast for inflation. Hence, we consider only the inflation equation of each VAR, which can be written:
where inflation is defined as the log di↵erence in the price level and the output gap (cyclical component of log GDP) is denoted y t . We allow for the maximum number of lags, p, to vary between 1 and P , where P equals 4. With four VAR forecasts in each ensemble, we construct the predictive densities using a linear opinion pool. The ensemble densities for inflation are defined by the convex combination: p(⇡ t ) = P X p=1 w p,t g(⇡ t | I p,t ), t= t, . . . , t,
where g(⇡ t | I p,t ) are the 1-step ahead forecast densities from model p, p = 1, . . . , 4 of inflation ⇡ t , conditional on the information set I t , and the evaluation period runs from t to t. That is, from (forecast targets) 2000.01 to 2013.03 in our New Zealand forecasting application. The publication delay in the production of real-time data ensures that this information set contains lagged variables, here assumed to be dated t 1 and earlier. The non-negative weights, w p,t , in this finite mixture sum to unity. Since each VAR produces a forecast density that is Student-t, the combined density defined by the linear opinion pool is a mixture.
We use the logarithmic score to measure density fit for each individual VAR specifica-tion. The logarithmic scoring rule assigns a high score to a density forecast with a high probability for the realised value and can be interpreted as a measure of the KullbackLeibler distance. The logarithmic score of the i th density forecast, ln g(⇡ o t | I p,t ), is the logarithm of the probability density function g(. | I p,t ), evaluated at the outturn ⇡ o t . The recursively constructed weights for the VAR ensemble are then given by:
i , t= t, . . . , t. 
